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Recent Developments
Corporate Liquidations Under I.R.C. Section 336 and the
Tax Benefit Rule: Tennessee- Carolina Transportation,
Inc. v. Commissioner
In Tennessee- Carolina Transportations, Inc. v. Commissioner,' the
Sixth Circuit applied the tax benefit rule2 to a corporate liquidation to
which Internal Revenue Code section 336 was applicable. This decision
rejected the holding of the Ninth Circuit on the same question. In
Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc.,4 the Ninth Circuit had held that
the tax benefit rule did not apply to a corporate liquidation because no sale
of corporate assets occurred.5
I. THE FACTS
The appellant Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. (Tennessee-
Carolina), pursuant to a contract, purchased all the capital stock of Service
Lines, Inc., which was similarly engaged in the motor freight transporta-
tion business.6 Service Lines was operated as a wholly owned subsidiary of
Tennessee-Carolina for two months.7 It then distributed its assets to
Tennessee-Carolina in liquidation.8 Included among these distributed
assets were truck tires and tubes that Service Lines had purchased for its
own use.9 Since the expected useful life of these tires and tubes was
approximately one year, their cost was properly deducted by Service Lines
when purchased.10 The crux of the matter was that, pursuant to I.R.C.
section 334(b)(2), Tennessee-Carolina could "claim a stepped-up basis in
the assets received from Service by allocating the purchase price of the
stock proportionately to the assets received based on their respective fair
1. 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978).
2. Id. at 379 n.l. The tax benefit rule provides that if an amount which was deducted from gross
income in a prior year is recovered in a later year then the amount recovered is included in gross income
in the later year. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. CL. 1967). See
generally I J. MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOMETAXATION §7.34 (1974). The rule is ofjudicial origin
and has been codified in part in Internal Revenue Code § I11.
3. Id. at 379.
4. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
5. Id. at 839.
6. 582 F.2d at 379.
7. Id. at 379-80.
8. Id. at 380. The liquidation consisted of Service Lines distributing all of its assets to taxpayerin
exchange for all its stock, which was then retired. This is an I.R.C. § 336 liquidation. I.R.C. § 337
employs a two-step procedure in which the acquiring taxpayer, here Tennessee-Carolina, would have
purchased all of Service's assets (presumably at the same price it paid for Service's stock). Service Lines
would then have liquidated and distributed the proceeds of the sale to its shareholders.
9. 582 F.2d at 380.
10. Id.
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market value"." Thus, assets that would have had a zero basis to Service
Lines were converted into assets with a basis equal to their fair market
value in the hands of the transferee Tennessee-Carolina.12 Upon allocation
of $94,940.00 to these tires and tubes, Tennessee-Carolina deducted the
entire amount as a business expense in its consolidated income tax return
for 1967.1'
The Commissioner asserted that the tax benefit rule required Service
Lines to include in its income "an amount equal to the value of the
previously expensed but not fully consumed tires and tubes which were
distributed" to Tennessee-Carolina. 4 The full Tax Court upheld this
position, 5 finding it necessary to reject the Ninth Circuit's holding in
South Lake Farms, Inc.,16 as "unduly restrictive."' 7
II. CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS AND THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
Under section 336,18 no loss or gain is recognized by a corporation on
the distribution of property in partial or complete liquidation. Section 336
differs, however, from most nonrecognition provisions that provide a
carryover basis for transferred property because it "ordinarily results in a
permanent nonrecognition of the liquidating corporation's gain or loss." 19
Permanent nonrecognition results from the stepped-up basis that may
occur under section 334(b)(2),20 in which the taxpayer determines the basis
for his assets by allocating the cost of the stock to the assets in proportion
to the relative fair market value of the assets. Because of this tax-avoiding
aspect of section 336, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has attempted to
override section 336 by application of other theories such as the tax benefit
rule.2' For example, in Tennessee-Carolina, unless the liquidating
11. Id.
12. Morrison, Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate Liquidations, 54
TAXES 902 (1976).
13. Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440, 445 (1975). This
value attributed to the tires and tubes was challenged. The Tax Court valued them at $36,394.67 which
the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 582 F.2d at 379 n.2.
14. 582 F.2d at 380.
15. Id. This was a narrowly-decided case in which the Tax Court split eight-seven.
16. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
17. 582 F.2d at 380.
18. I.R.C. § 336 provides: "Except as provided in section 453(d) (relating to disposition of
installment obligations), no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution of
property in partial or complete liquidation."
In addition to the exception for installment obligations, narrow recapture rules, such is §§
47(a)(1), 1245, and 1250 override § 336.
19. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS, 11.61, at 11-47 (3d ed. 1971).
20. For § 334(b)(2) to apply, several conditions must be satisfied. Generally, at least 80% of the
stock must be acquired by "purchase," as defined in § 334(b)(3), during a period of not more than twelve
months, and distribution must be pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation adopted not more than
two years after the purchase. B. BITTKER & J. EusTIcE, supra note 19, 11.41, at 11-36 to -37.
21. Id., 11.62, at 11-48.
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corporation was required to recapture its prior tax deduction under tax
benefit principles, there would be a double deduction for the same expense.
The IRS has also employed other theories in attempts to sidestep the
nonrecognition provision of section 336. Since the Internal Revenue Code
provides for taxation of income at both the corporate level when it is
earned and the shareholder level when it is distributed, corporations may
attempt to avoid taxation at the corporate level through an anticipatory
assignment of income before it is reportable. To prevent a double
exclusion of an income item, assignment of income principles are often
employed.22 These principles are the other side of the coin to the tax benefit
rule, which prevents a double deduction of the same expense. Although
Tennessee- Carolina did not consider the overlap of assignment of income
and tax benefit principles,23 the decision may possibly have an impact on
the use of assignment of income arguments in other corporate liquidation
cases. 24 Other theories include "clear reflection of income" under section
446(b). 25 This concerns the Commissioner's right to compel the use of
another accounting method to reflect more accurately income. Another
statutory argument invoked against liquidating taxpayers is section 482.6
This section permits the IRS to allocate income and deductions between
commonly-controlled organizations when it is necessary to prevent
evasion of taxes or to reflect income clearly.
In Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc.,27 the Ninth Circuit
rejected the application of the tax benefit rule to a corporate liquidation in
the absence of a sale of the corporate assets. There the liquidating cor-
poration had deducted expenses for the planting and cultivation of a
cotton crop and the preparation of land for raising barley.28 The
corporation was liquidated, however, in accordance with section 336 prior
to the harvesting of either crop.29 Under section 334(b)(2), the acquiring
corporation obtained a basis for these unharvested crops that included the
22. Morrison, supra note 12, at 905. However, the application of assignment or income
principles to § 336 liquidating distributions is haphazard due to the importance of the timing of
distributions and the termination of corporate existence. Id. at 905-15, 923.
23. Id. at 922. This occurs "whenever currently deductible expenses and expectations of future
profits are combined in a single zero-basis asset." Id.
24. Id. Morrison suggests three areas of impact. First, tax benefit principles may be used as an
alternative argument to an assignment of income theory which is often defeated either by termination
of the corporate existence or the limitation of such assignment principles to "fully earned" income.
United Mercantile Agencies, 34 T.C. 808 (1960). Second, the legal fiction of "receipt of an asset"
employed in Tennessee-Carolina may be extended to assignment of income cases. Third, § 334(bX2)
liquidations may be treated different from other § 336 liquidating distributions.
25. B. BOTrKER & J. EusTICE, supra note 19, 11.62, at 11-49. In South Lake Farms, Inc., the
§ 446(b) argument was rejected by both the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit.
26. B. BITrKER & J. EusricE, supra note 19, 11.62, at 11-50. Bittker also mentions the
possibility of taxation at the corporate level of contingent or "inchoate" income items when the
corporate existence was not properly terminated. This emphasizes the importance of a "timely"
liquidation to defeat the application of assignment of income principles. Id., 11.62, at 1l-50 to -57.
27. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
28. Id. at 838.
29. Id.
1979]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
value created by the deducted expenses. 30 The Ninth Circuit held that since
the requisite recovery of the earlier deduction by the liquidating
corporation had not occurred, the tax benefit rule would not apply. 31
Following South Lake Farms, Inc., Revenue Ruling 74-39632 was
issued. It required a subsidiary corporation liquidated into its parent
corporation in a non-taxable transaction under sections 332, 334(b)(2),
and 336 to include in its gross income, under the tax benefit rule, the
allocated value of incidental supplies it distributed to its parent for which a
deduction had been taken in the previous year resulting in a full tax
benefit.33 It also concluded that the South Lake Farms, Inc. interpretation
of recovery was erroneous. 34 An apparent conflict developed, however,
when the IRS published its acquiescence in the Tax Court's consideration
of South Lake Farms, Inc. 35 This conflict was explained in Revenue Ruling
77-67, 36 which withdrew the acquiescence. The explanation for the
acquiescence was that the Tax Court considered only sections 446(b) and
482. 37 Since the issue of the applicability of the tax benefit rule had not
been raised until the case was before the Ninth Circuit, the IRS'
acquiescence did not comment on the tax benefit rule.
III. ANALYSIS
In Tennessee-Carolina, the Sixth Circuit approached from several
directions taxpayer's argument that the tax benefit rule required a recovery
of the amount previously deducted. 38 First, the court found that the denial
of the applicability of the tax benefit rule "would produce an unnecessary
disparity between liquidations governed by § 336 and those governed by
Internal Revenue Code § 337."39 In this case, a section 337 liquidation
could have been accomplished in two steps: first, the taxpayer would have
purchased all of the liquidating corporation's assets at the same price it
would have paid for the stock, and second, the liquidating corporation
would have distributed the proceeds of the sale to its shareholders in
liquidation. The business consequences of either method would have been
30. Id.
31. Id. at 840. The lack of the element ofrecovery was based upon thc theory that the liquidating
corporation received nothing: "It was the stock of the old corporation that was sold, and the
stockholders who got the money." Id. at 839. Therefore, the gains were attributable to the stockholders,
Id. This results, however, in the benficial substitution of greater capital gains for the shareholders for
the taxation of the gain at ordinary corporate tax levels before distribution to the shareholders. See
Epstein, The Tax Benefit Rule in Corporate Liquidations, 6 TAx ADVISOR 454 (1975),
32. 1974-2 C.B. 106.
33. Id. at 106.
34. Id. at 107.
35. See 1975-1 C.B. 2.
36. 1977-1 C.B. 33.
37. Id. at 34.
38. "It [taxpayer] contends that Service [Lines, Inc.] had no 'recovery' of its expense deduction
for the tires and tubes since it distributed them directly to taxpayer and received nothing in exchange."




identical.40 Under section 337, however, the tax benefit rule would apply in
accordance with Anders v. United States.4 t
Having stated that the tax benefit rule applies to section 337
liquidations, the court applied the general rule that sections 336 and 337
liquidations should be treated alike unless some peculiar provision of
section 337 justifies disparate treatment.42 This parity theory had also been
discussed by the Sixth Circuit in a case in which it applied the assignment
of income doctrine to override the general nonrecognition provisions of
section 337.43 This parity argument is a concern over the "fundamental
inequity" that would result if similar sections 336 and 337 cases were
treated differently.44 The majority concluded its opinion with a refusal "to
elevate form over substance by reviving technical differentiations put to
rest in 1954 with the adoption of § 337. ''45
Even if the parity argument was insufficient, an alternative theory was
provided by the court. The failure of the tax benefit rule in South Lake
Farms, Inc. was predicated on the absence of any recovery of the
previously deducted amount. The Sixth Circuit rejected the requirement of
an actual physical "recovery" of some tangible asset;46 instead, it held that
[t]he rule should apply whenever there is an actual recovery of a previously
deducted amount or when there is some other event inconsistent with that
prior deduction. 4 7 The latter standard, which was applicable in
Tennessee-Carolina, serves "to counteract the inflexibility of the annual
accounting concept....'08
40. "Service liquidated, Service's shareholders in possession of the proceeds of the sale in
exchange for retirement of their stock, and the taxpayer in possession of Service's assets with a basis
equal to their purchase price." Id. at 381.
41. 462 F.2d 1147 (Ct. CL.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). This is one of a series ofdecisions
beginning with Commissioner v. Anders,414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S.958 (1969). in
which "it has become fairly established that section 337 must yield to the tax. benefit rule." O'Hare,
Application of the Tax Benefit Rule in New Case Threatens Certain Liquidations. 44 J. TAX. 200
(1976). The majority in the Sixth Circuit noted this article in a footnote. 582 F.2d at 380 n.7.
42. 582 F.2d at 381. The dissent argued that § 337 %%as "enacted as a shield to protect the
taxpayer, and notasasword to be utilized by the Government." Id. at 388. For a short history of§ 337
and the reasons for its enactment, see B. BITrKER & J. EusTcE, supra note 19, 11.63-64. For an
argument against the finding of parity between §§ 336 and 337, see Epstein, supra note 31, at 456.
43. Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110, 117 (6th Cir. 1973). The Tax Court has
adopted a similar parity rationale. See John T. Stewart, III, Trust, 63 T.C. 682 (1975).
44. 582 F.2d at 383.
45. Id. The accompanying footnote indicates the majority's belief that the court need not wait for
Congressional action. Id. at 383 n.16. This is consistent with the majority's earlier statement that the
court "should not hesitate to avoid inequitiesin the tax laws which are not specifically mandated by
Congress." Id. at381 n. 11. The dissent argued that "[i]f there is to be parity in tax treatment underthe
two sections, the tax results dictated by Section336 should control Section 337, and not vice versa." Id.
at 388 (Weick, J., dissenting). See Morrison, supra note 12, at 919.
46. Id. at 382.
47. Id. (emphasis in original). The court cites in support of this proposition: Block v.
Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338, 340-41 (1939), aff'd. sub nona. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, Ill
F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied., 311 U.S. 658 (1940).The dissent argues that the supporting language in
Block was nothing more than dictum. Id. at 384 (Weick, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 382. The annual accounting concept is often employed by the Service to compel the
taxpayer to use a method that clearly reflects income. Section446(b), however, has not been that useful
a device, as indicated by the rejection of the Commissioner's argument based upon § 446(b) in South
Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d at 838.
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The court also found that there had been a recovery since, at the time
of the liquidation, a usable asset was transferred to the taxpayer.4 9 "Thus,
in order for Service to be able to transfer them [tires and tubes] to
taxpayer, they must be deemed to have been recovered by Service at that
time. . . ,"' This recovery had been objected to as a legal fiction.51 The
Sixth Circuit countered this charge, stating that it was no more fictional
than the initial fiction which converted the tires and tubes into a nonentity.
Thus, the majority held that equity required this fictional reconversion into
tangible property.52 A further response to the contention that an actual
recovery is required was that the receipt of its own stock in exchange for
the assets transferred to taxpayer constituted an actual recovery.53
The requirement of an actual economic recovery before the tax benefit
rule can be applied was discussed in United States v. Nash. 4 In Nash, the
taxpayers had transferred to newly formed corporations accounts
receivable for which a bad debt reserve had been established. No recovery
of the amount of the bad debt reserve was found by the Supreme Court.
The rationale was that the taxpayer had only transferred the net value of
the receivables (face amount less bad debt reserve) to the new corporations
and had received stock worth that net value in exchange." The majority
stated that Nash was distinguishable from the situation in Tennessee-
Carolina since Service Lines had clearly transferred items that had been
the subject of prior deductions rather than only what was left after the
deduction.56 The dissent conceded that Nash implied that the tax benefit
rule would apply when the value of the securities received for the accounts
receivable exceeded the receivables' net worth. The dissent, however,
argued that the shareholders and not Service Lines recovered the tax
benefit.57 To this, the majority responded that Nash sought to reflect
business reality rather than reject the "fictional" recovery theory.5" Only a
further clarification of Nash can resolve this dispute.'9
It can be argued that since Congress can develop statutory recapture
devices, the courts should refuse to police the area of corporate
49. 582 F.2d at 382.
50. Id.
51. Id. See also Morrison, supra note 12, at 917.
52. 582 F.2d at 382.
53. Id. "It is true that this stock had no value after the liquidation was completed, but it had
considerable value at the time it was returned to Service. This is enough to satisfy any need for a
'recovery' by Service in order to apply the tax benefit rule." Id. (emphasis in original). The dissent
responded that "to attribute an economic recovery to the liquidating corporation from the transfer of
its assets for its stock would circumvent the explicit nonrecognition languag: of 26 U.SC. § 336." Id. at
385 n.4 (Weick, J., dissenting).
54. 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
55. Id. at 4.
56. 582 F.2d at 383.
57. Id. at 384-85 (Weick, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 383.
59. See Rev. Rul. 78-278, 1978-30 I.R.B. 5.
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liquidations for Congress. 60 This view, however, is too narrow an inter-
pretation of the courts' statutory construction powers. To maintain
that if there is to be parity under sections 336 and 337 the tax result dictated
by section 336 should control6' would be contrary to the decisions in
several jurisdictions in which the relationship between section 337 and the
tax benefit rule has been considered.62 Since Congress has not mandated
inequitable results between sections 336 and 337, the Sixth Circuit
properly avoided such a construction. The court's decision also avoided
the creation of another tax trap for the unwary similar to that existing
prior to the enactment of section 337.63
In an article64 following the Tax Court's decision, several inconsisten-
cies were noted that were not addressed on appeal to the Sixth Circuit. One
deals with the treatment afforded appreciated inventory received in a
liquidation under section 334(b)(2), in which the stepped-up basis in the
hands of the parent means that the appreciation is not recognized as
income by the parent on the sale of the inventory.65
It is unclear why the distribution of property with a value in excess of basis
due to the earlier deduction of the basis should result in income while the
appreciation on inventory distributed under Section 334(b)(2) goes
unrecognized as income even though it is sold in the ordinary course of
business by the parent corporation after liquidation. 6
Another problem concerns the adjustments in the parent's basis in the
stock following the recognition of income by the subsidiary under the tax
benefit rule. 67 Treasury Regulations sections 1.334-1(c)(4)(V)(a)(1) and (2)
require an increase in the adjusted basis of the subsidiary's stock held by
the parent with respect to which the distributions in liquidation are made
(1) by the amount of any unsecured liabilities assumed by the parent, and
(2) by the portion of the subsidiary's earnings and profits that arise between
the date of the acquisitions of the stock and the liquidating distribution. 6s
Thus, the parent gets a double step-up in basis as the net increase in
earnings and profits and the amount of income tax liability assumed by the
parent increase the adjusted basis of the stock. If all this increase in
60. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 19, 11.62, at 11-52.
61. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
62. Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147 (CL CI.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Spitalny
v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970); Commissioner v. Anders,414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1969).
63. 582 F.2d at 383 n.16. Section 337 was enacted to eliminate the tax trap created by
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331(1945), and United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv.
Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950), in which a selling-before-distributing liquidation was subject to double
taxation while a distributing-before-selling liquidation was only taxed once.
64. O'Hare, supra note 41, at 200.
65. Id. at 201-02. See Knapp King-Size Corp., 527 F.2d 1392 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
66. O'Hare, supra note 41, at 202.
67. See Morrison, supra note 12, at 919-22; O'Hare, supra note 41, at 202-03.
68. See O'Hare, supra note 41, at 202.
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adjusted basis were allocated to the tires and tubes or to other items that
could be expensed, the effect of the tax benefit rule would be meaningless.
69
Allocation methods other than specific allocation to the asset causing the
adjustments, however, are available. On the other extreme would be the
allocation of the additional basis solely to goodwill in which case the
offsetting deduction would be completely eliminated. 70 Another method
would be the allocation of an increased basis among all the assets, thereby
minimizing the offsetting deduction.71
The decision in Tennessee-Carolina is significant in several respects.
First, it creates a conflict between the Sixth and Ninth Circuits concerning
the applicability of the tax benefit rule in section 336 corporate
liquidations.72 Second, ii is a judicial attempt to establish parity as a
general rule between sections 336 and 337. Third, its result necessitates a
clarification of Nash's recovery standard. Finally, it raises a question of
basis adjustment and its appropriate allocation among the distributed
assets. Because of these uncertainties, one commentator has suggested that
tax planners should consider adopting a liquidation plan that would fall
beyond the ambit of section 334(b)(2) or postponing the liquidating
distribution until the expensed property is entirely consumed. 73 Another
suggested alternative would be a direct purchase of the assets in which only
the selling corporation would be affected by the tax benefit rule.74
Christopher J. Swift
69. See id.; Morrison, supra note 12, at 920. Both authors argue that this interpretation is
supported by a reasonable literal reading of the Regulations and First National State Bank of New
Jersey, 51 T.C. 419 (1968).
70. O'Hare, supra note 41, at 203.
71. Id.
72. O'Hare also discusses the applicability of Tennessee-Carolina to §§ 331 and 333. Id,
73. O'Hare, supra note 41, at 204.
74. Id.
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